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À mesure que les relations socioéconomiques coutumières entre les habitants de
Terre-Neuve furent rompues, les courants d’échanges habituels cessèrent de
fonctionner au cours du dix-huitième siècle. Parce que l’île était un espace contesté
– même en temps de paix –, les rapports économiques et sociaux existants donnèrent
aux civils le choix de résister, de collaborer ou de partir. Si certains furent ruinés,
d’autres ne virent aucun changement dans leur situation et d’autres encore
profitèrent même des nouvelles possibilités offertes. En fin de compte, il importait de
reprendre St. John’s moins pour faire valoir les revendications des Anglais dans la
région, que pour reconstruire l’économie et exercer un contrôle sur la circulation
des personnes et des marchandises à l’intérieur des sphères d’influence française et
anglaise d’outre-Atlantique.
As customary socio-economic relationships between the inhabitants of
Newfoundland broke down, normal patterns of exchange ceased to function during
the 18th century. Because the island was a contested space – even in peacetime –
existing economic and social connections enabled civilians to choose to resist,
collaborate, or flee. While some were ruined, others maintained the status quo, and
some even profited from new opportunities. In the end, re-capturing St. John’s was
less important for pressing English claims in the area than reconstructing the
economy and asserting control over the movement of people and trade within
overlapping French and English transatlantic worlds.
IT WAS A BOLD PLAN. On 8 May 1762 the Chevalier de Ternay’s squadron of
four ships, loaded with 870 French regulars, set sail from Brest, evaded the British
blockade, and escaped onto the high seas destined for Newfoundland. Ternay’s
mission was to capture and hold St. John’s, destroy the English fishery, secure
civilian prisoners for ransom, and recruit a regiment of Irish Catholic soldier-
sailors.1 On 20 June, he reached the Grand Banks, encountering several fishing boats
1 Duc de Choiseul to Chevalier de Ternay, 5, 9, and 15 April 1762, Archives de la Marine (MAR)
B4 104, fols. 51-7, Archives Nationales de France (AN), reel C-11993, Library and Archives Canada
(LAC). Folio references refer to the original as indicated in the transcripts. The author wishes to
thank his colleagues in the Department of History at Memorial University of Newfoundland
(MUN) – Sean Cadigan, Olaf U. Janzen, Lianne Leddy, and Jeff A. Webb – for reading and
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about eight leagues from the coast. A few were taken and burnt but others managed
to escape, spreading word of the imminent attack to St. John’s.2 In Newfoundland
and the merchant ports of western England, traders and fishermen panicked. In an
environment that supported only limited agriculture, Newfoundland merchants,
artisans, and fishermen relied on imported goods and labour to carry on the fishery.
Ternay’s attack, wrote a group of Poole merchants, would thus lead to a state
“inseparable from Want and Famine. An Event much to be dreaded! An Evil
immediable upon the approach of Winter! And a Calamity from which no Relief can
be expected, except by the speedy Expulsion of our Enemies from that Country and
the consequent Re-establishment of the Commerce and Tranquility.”3
English-language historians of Newfoundland once saw the island as a mono-
cultural, English colony. The legacy of Judge D.W. Prowse’s History of
Newfoundland, in this regard, casts a long shadow, painting the island’s history as
one of conflict between migratory fishermen and residents – the former supported
by imperial policy-makers in London who were said to have discouraged (or even
outlawed) permanent residency on the island.4 Beginning in the late 1960s, though,
historians sought to revise this narrow view (although, as Jerry Bannister has shown,
it still holds much popular appeal), emphasizing the complexities of the imperial
relationship rather than its stifling effect on the island’s growth and political
development.5 In this respect historians such as Keith Matthews emphasized the
importance of the economic and social aspects of the migratory fishery, which began
in the 16th century as an enterprise where merchants, mainly from West-Country
ports, hired servants to travel to the island where they would fish, dry their catch,
and return at the end of the season.6 Economic exchanges, it was argued, shaped the
English character of the island. The best grades of dried cod were sold in England
and Catholic Europe while the lowest-quality fish was shipped to the Caribbean to
feed African slaves who worked the sugar plantations; gold and wine flowed back
to England from Spain, Portugal, and Italy while rum was brought to Newfoundland
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commenting on various drafts of this paper. Robert Sweeny also assisted with some French
translation and handwriting interpretation. Any errors remain the responsiblity of the author alone.
2 Deposition of Samuel Doggets, 11 July 1762, War Office (WO) 34/26, fol. 172, The National
Archives (TNA), reel B-2651, LAC; see also Admiral Colville’s report to Jeffery Amherst in WO
34/42, fol. 92, TNA, reel B-2659, LAC, as well as Ternay to Choiseul, 9 July 1762, MAR, B4 104,
fol. 63-4, AN, reel C-11993, LAC. On the state of St. John’s defences, see J. Webb to Board of
Trade, 23 February 1761, Colonial Office (CO) 194/15, fol. 12, TNA, reel B-212, Centre for
Newfoundland Studies (CNS), MUN.
3 Petition from the Merchants and Inhabitants of Poole to the Principal Secretary of State for the
Northern Department and the Lords of the Admiralty, undated 1762, c. July/August 1762, Public
Record Office (PRO) 30/47/16, TNA.
4 D.W. Prowse, A History of Newfoundland from the English, Colonial and Foreign Records
(London: Macmillan, 1895).
5 Keith Matthews, “Historical Fence Building: A Critique of the Historiography of Newfoundland,”
Newfoundland Studies 17, no. 2 (2001): 143-65; Jerry Bannister, “Whigs and Nationalists: The
Legacy of Judge Prowse’s History of Newfoundland,” Acadiensis XXXII, no. 1 (Autumn 2002):
84-109.
6 Keith Matthews, “A History of the West of England-Newfoundland Fisheries” (PhD diss., Oxford
University, 1968). On Matthews’s work, see Jeff A. Webb, “Revisiting Fence Building: Keith
Matthews and Newfoundland Historiography,” Canadian Historical Review 91, no. 2 (June
2010): 315-38.
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from Jamaica and Bermuda. As Gordon Handcock demonstrated, failed settlement
schemes in the first decades of the 17th century provided the basis for a small
resident population that initially posed little threat to the dominance of the migratory
fishery but which grew in importance over time. When servants began to overwinter
in Newfoundland to get a head start on the next fishing season, claiming the best
“fishing rooms” (beachside premises where fishing operations were carried out) and
drying-beaches by right of first occupancy, they became permanent residents and
soon established a growing, self-sustaining population.7
In the late 1970s and early 1980s historians increasingly turned their attention to
the socio-economic dynamics of the island’s resident fishery and its effects on
political and social development, in part to escape the historiographical “fence-
building” decried by Matthews.8 These year-round occupants of the island hired
labourers, were supplied by merchants, and became known as “planters.”
Enterprising traders in the West Country then began to supply residents not only with
wage labourers, but also with the goods required to survive on the island and to fish.
Because Newfoundland had limited agricultural potential, residents relied almost
exclusively on imports obtained at the start of the season on a credit account that was
settled up by paying in dried fish in the fall. In the “truck system” traders would
extend credit to both resident fishermen and boat-keepers in order to purchase goods
and hire labour while they, in turn, charged servants for their supplies, holding back
wages until the end of the season when they settled up their own debts in dried cod.9
Since the early 1990s historians have debated the relative power of merchants,
planters, by-boatmen, and servants in the Newfoundland economy, focusing on class
struggle between capitalists and wage labourers.10 Merchants used the truck system
to amass huge fortunes while fishermen struggled under heavy debts; it was an
inherently volatile economic environment. “If catches or prices were poor,” writes
Sean Cadigan, “planters might be tempted to sell their fish to another merchant
should he offer slightly better prices than those of the planter’s own merchant. To
ensure a return on their credit, then, merchants had to seize their planters’ fish
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7 See also C. Grant Head, Eighteenth Century Newfoundland: A Geographer’s Perspective
(Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1976); W.S. MacNutt, The Atlantic Provinces: The
Emergence of Colonial Society, 1712-1857 (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1965), 1-28; and
Gordon Handcock, So Longe as there Comes Noe Women: Origins of English Settlement in
Newfoundland (St. John’s: Breakwater Press, 1989).
8 Matthews, “Historical Fence Building,” 161-2.
9 On Newfoundland in the 17th century, see Peter Pope, Fish into Wine: The Newfoundland
Plantation in the Seventeenth-Century (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press,
2003); on the social and economic history of the 18th century, see Head, Eighteenth Century
Newfoundland. For the development of its permanent population, see Handcock, So Longe as
there Comes Noe Women; and, for a good introduction to the truck system, see G.W. Hilton, The
Truck System: Including a History of the British Truck Acts, 1465-1960 (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1960).
10 For the dynamics of the debate, see Gerald Sider, Between History and Tomorrow: Making and
Breaking Everyday Life in Rural Newfoundland (Peterborough, ON: Broadview Press, 2003),
which is an update of his earlier Culture and Class in Anthropology and History: A Newfoundland
Illustration (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986). See also Sean Cadigan’s response:
“Power and Agency in Newfoundland and Labrador’s History,” Labour/Le Travail 54 (Fall
2004): 223-43.
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quickly if they thought this situation might unfold. If this occurred, however,
servants would no longer work because they had no hope of being paid at the end of
the fishing season.”11 This created mutual suspicions that made the fishery highly
vulnerable to disruption.12 But at the same time, as Cadigan argues, the cost of
imported labour eventually led to the development of a meaningful household
economy in the early 18th century that supported the growth of the resident fishery
and ultimately placed increased power and agency in the hands of ordinary people.13
While some historians such as Gerald Sider continue to emphasize the
determining influence of merchant capital, an important aspect of the debate has
been all but ignored: Newfoundland was simultaneously part of several overlapping
Atlantic worlds, even as late as the mid-18th century.14 Peter Pope’s Fish into Wine
demonstrates that during the 16th and 17th centuries Newfoundland was “a central
node in an international network . . . that linked [the island] not only with the West
Country but also with London, Iberia, the Mediterranean, the Atlantic islands, the
Netherlands, New England, and even New France.” In the English Atlantic, the cod
fishery fueled African slave labour on Caribbean plantations, generated a prosperous
trade between England and southern Europe, encouraged the migration of thousands
of Irish, French, and English, and led to the eradication of the indigenous Beothuk
people.15 Like other parts of that emerging world, it was a fluid and complex socio-
economic environment in which ethnic, class, and political differences took on new
meanings thus forcing us to rethink binary conceptions of class and labour.16 Yet
comparatively little attention has been given to the meaning of these international
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11 Sean Cadigan, “Merchant Capital, the State, and Labour in a British Colony: Servant-Master
Relations and Capital Accumulation in Newfoundland’s Northeast-Coast Fishery, 1775-1799,”
Journal of the Canadian Historical Association 2, no. 1 (1991): 24-5.
12 For a comparison of master-servant relationships in the empire, see Douglas Hay and Paul Craven,
Masters, Servants, and Magistrates in Britain and the Empire, 1562-1955 (Chapel Hill, NC:
University of North Carolina Press, 2004); Margaret Conrad, ed., Making Adjustments: Change
and Continuity in Planter Nova Scotia, 1759-1800 (Fredericton: Acadiensis Press, 1991); and
Allan Greer, Peasant, Lord, and Merchant: Rural Society in Three Quebec Parishes, 1740-1840
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1985).
13 The full thesis is explored in Sean T. Cadigan, Hope and Deception in Conception Bay:
Merchant-Settler Relations in Newfoundland, 1785-1855 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press,
1995). For a distillation, see Cadigan, “Power and Agency in Newfoundland and Labrador’s
History,” esp. 240-3.
14 Sider, Between History and Tomorrow, esp. 98-104. Aaron Fogleman’s definition of the Atlantic
World as a place defined by types of inter-cultural encounters in which ethnic, class, and political
differences took on new and important meanings is most useful. See his “The Transformation of
the Atlantic World, 1776-1867,” Atlantic Studies 6, no. 1 (April 2009): 5-6. The wider literature
is much too large to summarize here. For recent historiographical overviews and
interpretive/methodological discussions, see Alison Games, “Atlantic History: Definitions,
Challenges, and Opportunities,” American Historical Review 111, no. 3 (June 2006): 741-57, and
Philip Morgan and Jack Greene, “Introduction: The Present State of Atlantic History,” in Atlantic
History: A Critical Reappraisal, ed. Jack P. Greene and Philip D. Morgan (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2009), 3-34.
15 Pope, Fish into Wine, 80, 154; John Mannion, “Irish Migration and Settlement in Newfoundland:
The Formative Phase, 1697-1732,” Newfoundland Studies 17, no. 2 (Fall 2001): 257-93; Ingeborg
Marshall, A History and Ethnography of the Beothuk (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s
University Press, 1998).
16 Fogleman, “Transformation of the Atlantic World,” 6.
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relationships at the height of the growth period in the resident fishery during the
middle years of the 18th century. In many ways, mid-18th-century Newfoundland is
still conceived as an Anglo-Irish space in which the most important socio-economic-
political interactions were those between metropole and periphery.
But Newfoundland was very much a contested space where British interests and
pretences to power overlapped among French, Spanish, Dutch, Portuguese, and
Indigenous groups. In this space the English were far from unrivalled colonizers,
struggling not only with other European powers for control of the island’s resources
but also with the Beothuk, Mi’kmaq, and Inuit.17 Even so, the military history of the
island has largely been written from a British perspective, emphasizing the struggle
between British and French armies for physical control of the island.18 The
historiography of Ternay’s 1762 attack, in particular, tends to emphasize the
inevitability of British domination, casting the loss of St. John’s as a minor “raid” on
an unequivocal English possession and crowning the “re-capture” of the city as the
final event in the long struggle between France and Britain in America.19
Eighteenth-century Newfoundland should instead be thought of as “a space of
power,” to use Elizabeth’s Mancke’s term. Mancke argues that “imperial history
provides conceptual possibilities for reassembling the transoceanic and
multinational connections that, although widely prevalent, were too cross-grained
for more strictly colonial histories” to take into account. She argues that all across
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17 My thinking on this subject has been heavily influenced by Allan Dwyer’s important doctoral
dissertation entitled “Atlantic Borderland: Natives, Fishers, Planters, and Merchants in Notre
Dame Bay, 1713-1802” (PhD diss., Memorial University of Newfoundland, 2012), 1-2. See also
the seminal work of Olaf Uwe Janzen, “Une Grande Liaison: French Fishermen from Île Royale
on the Coast of Southwestern Newfoundland, 1714-1766 – A Preliminary Survey,” Newfoundland
Studies 3, no. 2 (1987): 183-200; Janzen, “‘Une Petite République’ in Southwestern
Newfoundland: The Limits of Imperial Authority in a Remote Maritime Environment,” Research
in Maritime History no. 3 (1992): 1-33; Janzen, “The Illicit Trade in English Cod into Spain,
1739-1748,” International Journal of Maritime History 8, no. 1 (June 1996): 1-22; and Dennis A.
Bartels and Olaf Uwe Janzen, “Micmac Migration to Western Newfoundland,” The Canadian
Journal of Native Studies 10, no. 1 (1990): 71-96.
18 On earlier military campaigns, see Alan F. Williams, Father Baudoin’s War: D’Iberville’s
Campaigns in Acadia and Newfoundland 1696, 1697 (St. John’s: MUN Department of
Geography, 1987), and James Pritchard, “Canada and the Defence of Newfoundland During the
War of the Spanish Succession 1702-1713,” in Canadian Military History Since the Seventeenth
Century: Proceedings of the Canadian Military History Conference, Ottawa, 5-9 May 2000, ed.
Yves Tremblay (Ottawa: Directorate of History and Heritage, National Defence, 2001), 49-57.
19 Evan Fyers, “The Loss and Recapture of St. John’s, Newfoundland in 1762,” Journal of the
Society for Army Historical Research 11 (1932): 179-215; David Webber, The Re-capture of St.
John’s, 1762 (St. John’s: Occasional Paper of the Newfoundland Military Museum, 1962). A
more balanced view, which analyzes the larger strategic context, is Olaf Janzen, “The French Raid
Upon the Newfoundland Fishery in 1762: A Study in the Nature and Limits of Eighteenth-Century
Sea Power,” in Naval History; the Seventh Symposium of the U.S. Naval Academy, ed. William B.
Cogar (Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources, 1988), 35-54. The French perspective is examined
in Maurice Linÿer de la Barbée, Le chevalier de Ternay: vie de Charles Henry Louis d’Arsac de
Ternay, chef d’escadre des armées navales, 1723-1780, 2 tomes (Grenoble: Éditions des 4
Seigneurs, 1972), tome I, 151-71; Georges Cerbelaud Salagnac, “La reprise de Terre-Neuve par
les Français en 1762,” Revue française d’histoire d’outre-mer LXIII, 231 (1976): 211-22; and
André de Visme, Terre-Neuve 1762: Dernier combat aux portes de la Nouvelle-France
([Montréal] : Les Editions André de Visme, 2005).
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Northeastern North America, including in Newfoundland and Labrador, the power
of European and Aboriginal groups fluctuated and remained disconnected from the
development of settlement; thus, viewing the history of the region through a single
colonial lens distorts our understanding of important intercultural connections. She
suggests, instead, that we discard our notion of national European colonies where
power was vested in a metropolis, instead conceiving of these places of settlement
and economic activity as spaces of power where “multiple claimants, including
natives” shared power in a decentralized system in which spheres of influence
overlapped, rather than abutted, one border upon another.20
Even on the Avalon, where British settlement was most heavily concentrated, it was
not a homogenously English space. As John Mannion has shown, by the middle of the
18th-century most of the servants who supported the resident fishery came from
Ireland. Bad harvests, religious persecution, and tales of fortune enticed thousands to
make the trek each year, not only to Newfoundland but also to other nodes in the North
Atlantic economy. As masters defaulted on wages or servants married into planter
families, the number of permanent Irish Catholic residents grew from almost none in
1698 to comprise over 40 per cent of an overwintering population of about 7,200 by
1752. The majority were young, unattached men, which fed a perception amongst the
English merchant and planter classes that the Irish were unstable, disloyal, and
unreliable. The presence of these “masterless men” who overwintered on the island
threatened to undermine pretensions to English control, domination, and subjugation.21
In large measure this is why the Board of Trade continued officially to support
the migratory fishery, which appeared on the surface to offer the most benefit to
British colonial interests. Not only did it generate more wealth in England, but it was
also understood to function as a nursery for seamen so that, in theory at least, the
fishing fleets would form a strategic reserve from which the navy could crew its
ships. King William’s Act (1699) represented an attempt to balance the interests of
residents and migrants. While it protected coastal areas, which traditionally had been
used to base fishing operations, it also allotted most of the island for settlement. In
this officially liminal space, Jerry Bannister argues that naval government – in which
the governor was a captain of a naval vessel that visited the island on a seasonal
basis – was an efficient means of exercising limited imperial control. 22
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20 Elizabeth Mancke, “Spaces of Power in the Early Modern Northeast,” in New England and the
Maritime Provinces: Connections and Comparisons, ed. Stephen J. Hornsby and John G. Reid
(Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2005), 32-3 (quotation on 32).
21 John Mannion, “Irish Migration and Settlement in Newfoundland: The Formative Phase, 1697-
1732,” Newfoundland Studies 17, no. 2 (2001): 257-8; Mannion, “‘. . . Notoriously disaffected to
the Government . . .’: British Allegations of Irish Disloyalty in Eighteenth-Century
Newfoundland,” Newfoundland Studies 16, no. 1 (2000): 3. For a comparative perspective, see
Hilary Beckles, “‘A Riotous and Unruly Lot’: Irish Indentured Servants and Freemen in the
English West Indies, 1644-1713,” William and Mary Quarterly, 3rd ser.,  47, no. 4 (October
1990): 503-22, and Terrence Murphy and Gerald John Stortz, Creed and Culture: The Place of
English-Speaking Catholics in Canadian Society, 1750-1930 (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-
Queen’s University Press, 1993). For the estimate of the population of Newfoundland in 1752, see
H. Drake, “A General Scheme of the Fishery and the Inhabitants of Newfoundland for the year
1752,”1752, CO 194/13, TNA, reel B-211, CNS, MUN.
22 On naval government in Newfoundland, see Jerry Bannister, The Rule of the Admirals: Law, Custom
and Naval Government in Newfoundland, 1699-1832 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press 2003);
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A detailed examination of the June 1762 French attack and subsequent occupation
of Newfoundland provides an opportunity to re-examine the nature of these
overlapping Atlantic worlds, the colony’s place within the history of a larger
European North America, and the limitations on the exercise of imperial authority in
contested spaces. When customary socio-economic relationships between English
merchants, resident planters, and migrant servants broke down, as the inhabitants of
Poole had feared, normal patterns of exchange ceased to function. But because
Newfoundland was a contested space, existing economic and social connections
enabled civilians to choose to resist, collaborate, or flee depending on their cultural
or socio-economic position within those networks. While some were ruined, others
maintained the status quo or even profited from new opportunities. In a contested
space of power, re-capturing St. John’s was less important for pressing British claims
in the area than reconstructing the economy and asserting control over the flow of
people and trade within overlapping French and English transatlantic worlds.
When Newfoundland is framed as a space of power rather than an English
colony, it becomes clear that naval government was a necessity in an area where
imperial authority and the possibility of centralized control were limited by the
influence of other claimants to the region. In this respect, the most active rival co-
claimant was France. English historians have often forgotten that the island and its
offshore resources remained a simultaneous part of a French Atlantic that linked
slave posts in western Africa to settled colonies and economic interests in the
Caribbean, South America, Canada, Louisiana, and Newfoundland.23 Again, this is
because after 1713 France had no major colony in the region which, in traditional
colonial narratives, is synonymous with the exercise of power and territorial control.
But as Kenneth Banks writes: “In considering the French Atlantic as a distinct entity,
it is also useful to see it as part of a larger transatlantic, transnational, and cross-
cultural Atlantic zone in the 1500-1800 era, one layer of many other ‘Atlantics,’
which, if laid like transparencies one atop of another, formed the Atlantic World.”24
In this multi-polar world, settlement only denoted one form of imperial possession.
In the French empire, colonies were viewed rather as individual economic zones that
produced distinct resources – some via settlement, others through informal means
such as the seasonal exploitation of resources and trade.25 Like the English, the
French came to Newfoundland to fish cod. While the Treaty of Utrecht surrendered
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Bannister, “The Naval State in Newfoundland, 1749-1791,” Journal of the Canadian Historical
Association 11, no. 1 (2000): 17-50; and Bannister, “The Fishing Admirals in Eighteenth-Century
Newfoundland,” Newfoundland Studies 17, no. 2 (2001): 166-219. For a comparison, see Arthur J.
Stone, “The Admiralty Court in Colonial Nova Scotia,” Dalhousie Law Journal 17, no. 2 (Fall 1994):
363-429. Historians debate the actual importance of the “nursery of seamen.” See Gerald Graham,
“Fisheries and Sea Power,” Canadian Historical Association Annual Report 20 (1941): 24, and David
Starkey, “The West Country-Newfoundland Fishery and the Manning of the Royal Navy,” in Security
and Defence in South-West England Before 1800, ed. Robert Higham (Exeter, UK: University of
Exeter Press, 1987), 93-101. The dates are from Cadigan, Newfoundland and Labrador, 60.
23 Kenneth J. Banks, Chasing Empire Across the Sea: Communications and the State in the French
Atlantic, 1713-1763 (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2002), 8-9.
24 Mancke, “Spaces of Power in the Early Modern Northeast,” 32-4, 9-10.
25 Dale Miquelon, “Envisioning the French Empire: Utrecht, 1711-1713,” French Historical Studies
24, no. 4 (Fall 2001): 671-7.
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their settlement at Plaisance, the French continued to exploit the fishery, as Allan
Dwyer has clearly shown in his study of the Notre Dame Bay region, and to regard
it as a part of their overseas empire until the early 19th century – straining to
influence and control fishing grounds, the movements of people, and paths of
economic and cultural communication.26
The continued French commitment to Newfoundland reflected the tangible
social, economic, and cultural connections that had developed between France’s
Atlantic merchant ports and the fishery. Historically, the French caught more fish at
Newfoundland than the English. In the years before the outbreak of war, for
example, the French made 420,000 quintals of dried cod to the English’s 360,000 on
Newfoundland shores alone, mainly by ships from Saint-Malo.27 Like the British
Board of Trade, the French also regarded the fishery as a “nursery for seamen.” As
Jean-François Brière has demonstrated, the Newfoundland fishery alone produced
2,000 new seamen each year and likely accounted for more than a quarter of the
40,000 to 60,000 able-bodied seamen in the French navy at the outbreak of war.28
During the Seven Years’ War, as France lost most of its overseas possessions to
the British, negotiators refused to relinquish their stake in the fishery. When peace
negotiations broke down in the fall of 1761 it was over continued access to the
fishery – even though the French navy had experienced a series of naval disasters
that left the British holding roughly 50 per cent of their sailors in captivity.29 But the
French war minister, the duc de Choiseul, believed that if France was to regain the
strength necessary to challenge British naval supremacy in a future war, it would be
through Newfoundland’s continued presence within the French empire as a nursery
for seamen. Economic imperatives thus combined with strategic goals to convince
Choiseul to launch an invasion of the island in 1762 rather than develop other
possible avenues of attack in Africa, South America, or the Caribbean. Such an
operation would not only make the best use of limited resources, but also provide an
opportunity to reassert French claims to the fishery.30
Choiseul’s initial plan proposed sending a squadron carrying several hundred
men to attack the English fishery, landing artillery officers and engineers to
recapture the former French colony at Plaisance. There they were to wait, holding it
until the spring of 1763. The long-term objective was to use the island as a base from
which to launch an invasion of the occupied colonies along the St. Lawrence the
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26 Dwyer, “Atlantic Borderland,” 66-105.
27 Compiled from “Questions and Answers Related to the State of the French and British Fisheries
at Newfoundland, 1762,” British Library, Additional Manuscripts 35913, Maritime History
Archive (MHA), MUN.
28 Jean-François Brière, La pêche française en Amérique du Nord au XVIIIe siècle (Saint-Laurent, 
QC : Fides, 1990), 223; on the decline of French naval manpower, see Jonathan R. Dull, The
French Navy and the Seven Years’ War (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 2005), 13-14,
194-5, and James Pritchard, Louis XV’s Navy, 1748-1762: A Study of Organization and
Administration (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1987), 71-82 (esp. 82).
29 Brière, La pêche française en Amérique du Nord au XVIIIe siècle, 223; Dull, French Navy and
the Seven Years’ War, 13-14.
30 Choiseul, “Plan de Campagne par Mer pour l’Année, 1762,” MAR B4 104, fols. 4-9, AN, reel C-
11993, LAC. See also Georges Cerbelaud Salagnac, “La reprise de Terre-Neuve par les Français
en 1762,” 211-22.
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following year. But even if the squadron failed to conquer the city, Choiseul noted
that the damage done to the English fishery would, in and of itself, constitute a
serious blow to the enemy’s interests.31
To command the mission the French war minister chose Charles-Henri-Louis
d’Arsac, the Chevalier de Ternay, a young naval officer who had risen relatively
quickly through posts in the Mediterranean.32 Choiseul gave Ternay three sets of
specific instructions on 5, 9, and 12 April. The main goal would be to “ravager et de
détruire autant qu’il se pourra, le commerce de la Pesche anglaise dans l’Isle et sur
le Banc de Terre Neuve.” Ternay was then to land his infantry forces, capturing St.
John’s rather than Plaisance as required in the initial conception of the operation.
Ternay, with this accomplished, would work up and down the coast, “détruira et
brûlera touttes les Cabanes, Bateaux et engins de Pesche, enlevera le plus de
pesheurs qu’il pourra, et après ces Expeditions sur L’Isle de Terre Neuve auxquelles
il employera le moins de tems qu’il sera possible, il viendra les continuer sur le Banc
de Terre Neuve en tâchant de couler bas ou de brûler le plus de Bâtiments de Pesche
qu’il pourra, ainsy que les échauffants destinées a Secher le Poisson.” These tasks
were to be completed no later than the beginning of November, when Ternay would
return to France and leave behind a garrison to hold the city.33
To assist Ternay in taking the city, on 9 April Choiseul assigned two senior
infantry officers (Colonel Comte d’Haussonville and Lieutenant-Colonel
Bellecombe), as well as an artillery officer, to oversee land operations, a siege, and
to make preparations to defend St. John’s for a period of time.34 Although an
engineer was assigned to help in this work, he was also tasked with creating the first
detailed maps of the coastline.35 This indicates that Ternay was being given both the
expertise and tools necessary to mount a prolonged occupation. At first, he was
skeptical. In July 1762, Ternay wrote to the war minister:
Vous voudrez bien vous rappeler, Monseigneur, que lorsqu’il fut
question du projet dattaque de lisle de Terreneuve je mappliquay a
detruire les idées d’établissement que vous parûtes avoir dans cette
meme isle. Vous me fîtes lhonneur de me parler de St Jean je navois
alors aucune idée de çe port je ne conçevois pas comment il était
possible de se maintenir dans un poste entouré d’ennemis et eloigné
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32 Salagnac, “La reprise de Terre-Neuve par les Français en 1762,” 212-3. On Ternay, see Barbée,
Le chevalier de Ternay; for his role in the campaign specifically, see tome I, 151-71.
33 “Mémoire du Roy pour servir d’instruction Chev. de Ternay,” 5 April 1762, MAR B4 104, fol. 51
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34 Choiseul to Ternay, 9 April 1762, MAR B4 104, fol. 55, AN, reel C-11993, LAC.
35 Gordon Handcock, “State-of-the-Art French Cartography in Eighteenth Century Newfoundland:
The Work of Marc Antoine Sicre de Cinq-Mars,” Newfoundland Studies 4, no. 2 (1988): 148.
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de tout secours je mis donc a la voille dans lintention de me
conformer exactement au 1er plan que vous avez arresté mais jay
reconnu Mon erreur lorsque je me suis trouvé dans un port dont
lembouchure etroite peut estre deffendüe avec facilite.36
Only after Ternay had actually captured St. John’s and saw the narrow harbour for
himself did he understand why Choiseul believed that the port could be held, even
though it would quickly be surrounded by the enemy.37
Choiseul’s third set of instructions was issued on 12 April, presenting the young
naval officer with a complex strategy designed to not only capture the city but also to
destabilize the English economy and monopolistic claims to power in the region. The
instructions ordered Ternay to use the mission to augment French manpower by
recruiting a new regiment of soldier-sailors from amongst the Irish Catholic
population.38 Recruiting the regiment became the task of Jean-Baptiste Sutton de
Clonard, the younger brother of prominent Irish-French merchant Thomas Sutton de
Clonard. The Suttons were an important Wexford merchant family who operated
within both the British and French Atlantic trading networks. They appear to have
begun as salt-meat merchants in Wexford during the 1740s but, as Louis M. Cullen
has shown, by 1762 Thomas Sutton had moved to France where he operated as a
trader out of Saint-Malo. He became prominent in that city’s circle of merchant-
adventurers, who linked the French metropolis to the colonies in America, Africa, and
India through a triangular trade in provisions, slaves, and raw materials. After the
war, he would go on to lead the French East India Company and, along with the Duc
de Choiseul, champion a failed French plantation scheme at Cayenne, Guiana.39
It was his younger brother, Jean-Baptiste, who ran the family’s trading operations
in Newfoundland.40 The younger Sutton was well known to both Irish and English
inhabitants and was recognized during the campaign by several witnesses; one of his
captives, Francis Hearn, actually claimed that Sutton had been born in
Newfoundland.41 St. John’s Justice of the Peace John Stripling specifically
recognized him as a Wexford trader, which would make sense given the importance
of salt-meat in the Newfoundland fisherman’s diet.42 That he moved between
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41 Deposition of Francis Hearn, 15 August 1762, WO 34/26, fol. 194, TNA, reel B-2651, LAC. For
other reports of Sutton, see affidavit of John Lewis, 15 August 1762, WO 34/26, fol. 194, TNA,
reel B-2651, LAC, and “Intelligence Gathered at Placentia,” 1762, WO 34/42, fol. 98, TNA.
42 Deposition of John Stripling, 2 September 1762, WO 34/26, fol. 205, TNA, reel B-2651, LAC;
Stripling was an especially reliable witness, having signed surrender documents at St. John’s in
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English and French clients on the island is implied by his family’s Saint-Malo
connection, indicating that he participated in a triangular trade in salt-meat and dried
fish that he brought back upon his return to Europe. Before the outbreak of war
Saint-Malo’s trade accounted for 60 per cent of France’s dry fishery at
Newfoundland, with some 70 ships and around 3,500 men making more than
250,000 quintals of cod annually on French Shore beaches.43 As a man with a foot
in both the British and French worlds, Sutton was a logical choice to lead the
recruiting mission.44
The war minister’s final set of instructions also demanded a more targeted
campaign of destruction that would be used to entice Irish servants to join Clonard:
En suivant les instructions que vous ont été données pour incendier
tous les Bâtiments de mer et les Engins de pêche, vous ne pouvez
manquer de réduire tous les matelots pêcheurs à la plus grande
misere, il faudra en profiter pour faire embarquer sur Votre Escadre
tous les pescheurs Irlandais et Catholiques que vous trouverez, et de
concert avec le S. de Cloynard [sic] qui sera en etat de les bien
connaitre, Vous les engagerez au Service du Roy pour former un
Bataillon de Matelots Soldats Irlandais dont vous confierez le
Commandement et la conduitte au S. de Cloynard jusque à votre
arrivée en france, et pour parvenir plus facilement à ces
engagements, vous ferez promettre par le S. de Cloynard a ceux
d’Entré aux qui seront Capitaines et officiers Mariniers qu’on leur
donnera à leur arrivée en france, des grades d’officiers dans ce
Bataillon S’ils se prêtent promptement a le former sinon en tout du
moins en partie.45
Choiseul believed that if fishing boats, oceangoing ships, and all gear could be
destroyed, the fishery would have to cease and the Irish servants would be unable to
escape. This would reduce them to “great misery” as they would no longer be paid
their wages, would have no means to return home, and would face a harsh winter
without provisions. This, the war minister argued, would present an opportunity for
Sutton to use his connections on the island to entice servants to switch masters,
diverting their labour to coincide with French imperial goals rather than English.46
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44 Choiseul to Ternay, 12 April 1762, MAR B4 104, fol. 57, AN, reel C-11993, LAC.
45 Choiseul to Ternay, 12 April 1762, MAR B4 104, fol. 57, AN, reel C-11993, LAC.
46 Choiseul to Ternay, 12 April 1762, MAR B4 104, fol. 57, AN, reel C-11993, LAC.
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The war minister also intended Ternay to use the same tactics to induce
prominent citizens to surrender and then use them to negotiate the release of French
sailors who had been imprisoned in Britain. He told the admiral:
Après avoir brulé dans L’Isle de Terre Neuve tous les angards,
magazins et tous engins propres à la Peshe, vous menacerez de
brûler aussi les maisons et d’enlever tous les habitants que vous
pourrez embarquer comme prisonniers de guerre, et Surtout les
Juges de paix qui sont les Magistrats des lieux; mais comme pour
eviter leur éxpatriation et l’incendié de leurs maisons, il ne
manqueront pas de vous proposer de capituler, vous pourrez alors
vous relâcher et Signer avec les Magistrats une Capitulation dans
laquelle vous auriez soin de Stipuler un Echange de tous les
prisonniers que Vous Seriez dans le cas de faire pour un même
nombre de nos officiers mariniers et matelots actuellement détenues
en Angleterre.47
While Ternay would again burn boats and fishing gear, this time he would
convince prominent civilians to surrender by promising to spare their houses and
stores – but only if they capitulated without a fight. This was meant to appeal
directly to the interests of the most politically valuable members of the community:
those who had invested significant capital in goods and fixed property. Choiseul told
Ternay that once the prominent members of the colony had surrendered and pledged
not to take up arms against the French King for the duration of the war he was to
deport some of them using their papers to negotiate an exchange of prisoners with
the English government. The result would not only cripple the English fishery, but
also destroy Britain’s economic and political influence on the island’s east coast by
eliminating a main centre of trade and power.48
When Ternay set sail in early May 1762, he was thus embarking on a dangerous
mission that was designed to reassert the French presence in Newfoundland before
peace negotiations resumed. It was not a mission aimed solely at destruction, but
was intended to alter balances of power and destabilize English claims to exclusive
control over the island. After a largely uneventful ocean crossing, on 24 June
Ternay’s ships turned into Bay Bulls where they landed several hundred French
soldiers under the Comte d’Haussonville (a veteran of the fighting at Quebec).49
Once ashore, the French burned the flakes, stages, and boats but, as had been
planned, only destroyed the homes and possessions of the English inhabitants who
fled into the interior.50 The French commander then distributed copies of a
“manifesto” written by the Comte d’Haussonville that enjoined:
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We count d’Haussonville, French General, do declare to all the
inhabitants of the island of Newfoundland that the French
grenadiers landed on the said island, we shall not do them any harm
but shall protect them, if they do not take armes, if they give
necessary succour; we bound them expressly as well of these
justices of peace and principal planters, do not leave their houses or
settlements neither to defend themselves; if they do anything
against the said declaration, they shall be treated according to the
laws of war.51
The manifesto was meant to induce the population of nearby St. John’s to surrender
on the promise that fixed property and trade goods would be protected.52 The next
day, Ternay’s force began the eight-mile march northwards to the port, guided by
Irish fishermen recruited at Bay Bulls.53
While traders and the commercial population of St. John’s with large stores of
goods and accumulated capital might be persuaded to accept the French offer,
fishermen and emergent traders (planters who had begun to accumulate enough
wealth to act as petty merchants and local suppliers) with few fixed assets were more
inclined to resist. Those with the most to lose were the fishermen and emergent
traders of Conception Bay, who participated in a mixed economy that included
fishing, trade, and limited agriculture.54 As illustrated by Table 1, the permanent
population of Conception Bay (men, women, and children) was scattered across a
number of communities up to 30 kilometres west of St. John’s and had grown by
nearly 400 per cent in the decade after 1752.55 By the time of the invasion there were
around 320 resident men living in the bay, most of whom would have hired servants
to work the fishery; many also engaged in limited trade with other residents, either
by renting out fishing rooms or trading in moderate amounts of fish and goods. This
remarkable increase in the population was also supported by concurrent growth in
agriculture so that by 1762 each resident male, on average, had just over 6 acres of
improved land and 4.3 children. This stability reinforced the dominance of the
resident fishery so that by 1760 (the last year before the occupation with complete
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figures), it accounted for more than 75 per cent of the total catch compared with only
60 per cent eight years before. At the same time the economy was diversifying so
that, by the time of the invasion, seal oil and furs were becoming major sources of
income during winter, generating a modest surplus that could be reinvested in
commercial trade with other fishermen and residents. Many of those living in
Conception Bay would have been dependent on local trade networks for the
acquisition of supplies, local buyers for their fish, oil, and furs, and stable sources of
migrant labour. They had little to gain by agreeing to d’Haussonville’s terms
because, in such a mixed economy, survival still depended on carrying on the
fishery.56
As the French marched from Bay Bulls, 370 men from Conception Bay
descended on St. John’s ready to resist the invaders.57 The annual report on the state
of the fishery and the inhabitants of the island lists the total male population
(resident and migrant) of Conception Bay as 2,420 for 1762, which would suggest
that a minimum of just over 15 per cent volunteered.58 Those who remained at their
homes and fishing rooms (or fled into the interior and up the coast) would have
included established merchants and fishermen who had much to risk by fighting.
These choices made by the population – to fight, to remain at home, or to flee – do
not break down neatly according to traditional socio-economic categories such as
planter, merchant, servant, or by-boatmen; they reflect the overlapping nature of
those positions within society. Some residents were emergent traders with a
significant personal stake in the fishery while others, like Harbour Grace merchant
Charles Garland, were more dependent on trade than their own participation in the
fishery. Agriculture would have been more important for some than others.
Migratory or resident wage-labourers would also have had to evaluate their own
prospects of being paid (and provisioned) according to their master’s situation.
While Fort William, which protected the north side of the harbour, was in a poor
state of repair and garrisoned by only 80 soldiers, there were other factors that
worked in the defenders’ favour.59 As the French drew near, it was clear that they had
been unable to haul their artillery over the difficult roads. The 500 men under
d’Haussonville would thus have had no way of taking the fort but by direct infantry
assault across open ground defended by ten British guns.60 Buoyed by the
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appearance of the civilian volunteers, the garrison’s commander, Captain Walter
Ross, gave orders to distribute arms and ammunition and this brought the total
British force to around 450 men.61
When the French made camp before the town on the evening of the 26th, the
Comte d’Haussonville dispatched a revised version of his manifesto to the
townspeople which read in part: “[We] give notice to all the inhabitants . . . not to
go out of the town neither to go into the woods, nor to sea, under the penalty that is
inflicted by the laws of war. We promise and assure all the inhabitants that if they
surrender themselves without arms, we shall use them as Frenchmen, and we shall
not do them the least molestation, but to the contrary we will protect them.”62 While
the soldiers and the makeshift militia prepared to resist, many of the townspeople –
who would have included established merchants and emerging traders as well as
artisans and tavern keepers – were more inclined to listen to the French offer for a
negotiated surrender.
By 1762, St. John’s was a thriving commercial trading centre. A detailed list of
imports from July 1760 shows 46 ships arriving in harbour and indicates that traders
were increasingly importing not only basic provisions and equipment for the fishery
but also luxury goods, such as silk, tobacco, refined sugar, and olive oil. That month
two of the ships alone brought in 100 pairs of women’s shoes, 50 dozen pairs of
men’s shoes, 11 chests of “wearing apparel,” and 150 ready-made garments, all of
which were for resale on the island.63 Those wholly dependent on the import and
export trade (and its commercial spinoffs) stood to lose everything if the garrison did
not agree to d’Haussonville’s terms. If “treated like Frenchmen,” though, they might
protect their investments in capital goods or possibly even continue to profit from a
new trade with the enemy.
To the horror of some, when the French demanded that the fort surrender the next
day the envoys were sent away as British soldiers began distributing ammunition to
the militia and loading their cannon.64 While d’Haussonville prepared to assault the
fort, 24 of the town’s “principal merchants and inhabitants” demanded a meeting
with Captain Ross. They presented him with the following petition:
[We] beg leave to represent to you our great fears at your sending
away the flag of truce and refusing to give up this fort. . . . We have
hitherto done everything in our power according to your directions
for the good of his majesty’s service, but we must now acknowledge
that we are not able to do more, and that you are not to expect that
neither we nor any other inhabitants will wait till the place is
stormed by such a superior power, and our effects, families, and
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lives being then at the mercy of the enemy when we are not able to
oppose which we mean to endeavour to prevent and not using any
defence or offensive arms at this juncture, besides most of the boat
keepers and stoutest men of this place are gone.65
As the officers of the garrison later reported, upon receiving this paper Ross
determined that without the support of prominent merchants it would be impossible
to defend the fort. He emerged from the meeting with Michael Gill, a local merchant
and chief magistrate, and told the crowd of civilian volunteers to disperse and “that
when they wanted their service, they would send for men.”66 The officers and
magistrates then signed surrender papers for the fort and town.67
The townspeople had behaved exactly as the French had anticipated. As Gill
explained in a letter to Charles Garland, a merchant and magistrate at Harbour Grace
in Conception Bay, they had advocated for capitulation because the French “General
has promised that we shall be secure in our possessions and effects, which is the
terms of our capitulation.”68 In capitulation, some saw an opportunity to protect
accumulated material wealth. Those who made their living from trans-Atlantic or
coastal trade did so by exploiting larger networks; for many, the island was only one
of many nodes.69 Surrender thus protected local investments while occupation might
actually offer new opportunities for trade with former enemies.70
When St. John’s surrendered, it became the temporary headquarters of the French
garrison in Newfoundland. That summer d’Haussonville and Bellecombe began to
improve the town defences in anticipation of a British attack and the long winter
ahead, deporting many of the less well-heeled English inhabitants to New England and
Nova Scotia.71 Ternay, meanwhile, seized 40 ships in the harbour, outfitting the larger
vessels with cannons and skeleton crews to assert French authority in communities
further up the coast. The important nature of that part of the enterprise to the larger
French mission is captured by the cartographic activities of Marc-Antoine sieur de
Cinq-Mars.72 Map-making is an act of possession in that it is an exercise that attempts
to assert control over the environment and territory by documenting, defining, and
laying claim and thus enabling the communication of imperial control to others.73 As
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Gordon Handcock notes, the French maps produced in 1762 were the most detailed
depictions of Newfoundland completed to that point in the 18th century. The decision
to dispatch not only troops, but also a mapmaker up the coast reflects the larger
economic and political aspirations embodied by Choiseul’s plan.74
One of the harbours occupied and thoroughly mapped was Trinity, 250 kilometres
northwest of St. John’s.75 There a similar debate ensued between those who wished to
defend their homes and those who were more inclined to attempt to negotiate with the
French and to use the occupation to their advantage. The diary of the prominent Trinity
merchant-magistrate Benjamin Lester provides a unique window into the world of
occupied Newfoundland and the pragmatic choices made by its inhabitants.76
According to Lester, on 30 June word reached Trinity that the French had sacked Bay
Bulls.77 Lester was hesitant to organize a defence as he also soon learned that the
French were “humane people [who] dont hurt anybody but protect them the General,
Compt D’hausant Selle publish’d his Manafesto under hand to all the Inhabitants of
N.f.Land that if they would keep provissions of their Houses & give him Succors he
would not hurt them, which we hear he has Complyd . . . [at Bay Bulls] they Burnt all
the Houses except two, which was all that was posess’d, whatever they wanted pay’d
for.” While some residents advocated resistance it was all but impossible without the
blessing of Lester and other members of the merchant elite, who not only controlled
access to arms and ammunition but also governed supplies and labour. When French
forces finally arrived on 17 July the town’s principal inhabitants chose to follow the
same course as their counterparts in St. John’s, surrendering after firing a symbolic
shot from the tiny battery at the entrance to the harbour.78
Lester’s capitulation at Trinity soon transitioned into collaboration. Each day
during the two-week occupation, the “Commandant,” as Lester called him, gave
orders for provisions that the merchant obtained from the other townspeople. In
gathering supplies and information, it is telling that the French appointed the
existing chief magistrate as their liaison, leaving the British social structure intact
but co-opting it to their own purposes.79 In co-operating, Lester was able to preserve
his life and property while profiting from the new trade he carried on with the
French. When goods were demanded, Lester noted in his diary that the French
refused to take anything from him without paying for it – even gifts of beer and wine
intended to win their favour.80 While Lester expropriated livestock and provisions
from his neighbours, he sold brandy, malt, soap, and other goods to the French from
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his own stores. He also began to hire out his boats and servants to carry supplies and
provisions to their garrisons in Conception Bay and St. John’s.81
Like the merchants at St. John’s, Lester also used the occupation to improve his
long-term economic position. He repeatedly and self-interestedly targeted two
residents, Lambert and Terrell, taking all their livestock and much of their provisions
to meet French demands without paying compensation. When the French began to
burn boats, flakes, and stages as well as the houses of those who fled the town, it was
Lester who chose which properties would be destroyed and which would be spared.
Both Lambert and Terrell’s works in the harbour were destroyed on his orders.82
These two men were emergent planter-traders who continued to hire servants to fish,
but who had also begun to extend credit to others themselves. Lambert was married,
with two boats and 18 servants; he was a local churchwarden and overseer of the poor
and sometimes acted as an agent for the Ballard West Country merchants; and he had
had legal disputes with Lester before.83 Terrell seems to have owned multiple rooms,
stages, and ships at Trinity.84 As emergent traders, Lambert and Terrell were upstart
rivals. Targeting them allowed Lester to turn the occupation to his advantage as, when
it came to an end, he would be better positioned to re-establish trade. As Allan Dwyer
has argued in his case study of Lester’s expansion into Notre Dame Bay during the
1770s, it was typical of a larger pattern in which the established merchant used the
ambiguity of contested spaces and borderland regions to his advantage – trading
allies in order to ruthlessly eliminate more junior rivals.85
Emerging planter-traders were vulnerable as they were both in debt to more senior
merchants and had most of their assets tied up in the credit they had extended to other
fishermen.86 They were also heavily invested in fishing themselves. Unlike Lester, they
had limited authority, power, and wealth with which to bargain for favourable
treatment. This lack of agency heightened levels of fear – even where the French failed
to appear – and prompted traders and their clients to take precipitate action. At St.
Mary’s Harbour, Henry Thresher, a junior agent of a Poole merchant, decided to seize
1,330 quintals of cod as well as a proportionate amount of train oil (derived from cod
livers) from one of his debtor-planters – Thomas Townshend. Townshend’s servants
consequently abandoned him, knowing that he would be unable to pay them their
wages.87 Just as nervous creditors might move in to seize their debtor’s fish if they saw
an opportunity to cut their losses, so too might a fisherman’s servants pre-emptively
desert as soon as they suspected that their master would be unable to pay. John Power
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of Tilting Harbour on Fogo Island, for example, hired William Sullivan and several
other men to fish for him in September 1761. Even though the French never reached
the harbour, his merchant on the main island disappeared and his supplies ran out
around 1 August. His servants abandoned him for lack of provisions late that summer.88
While servants provided the labour necessary to fish, they were still creditors with a
claim on their master’s profits. This made them a potential liability when supplies ran
low or catches proved poor. Everywhere, mutual suspicion prevailed.
Many fishermen in Trinity and elsewhere chose to flee as soon as word of the
French landing at Bay Bulls began to spread and resistance proved impossible.89 As
a node in a larger Atlantic world, Newfoundland was not a closed economic or social
system. It was a place where merchants, planters, and servants earned a living
through various means; but all had social, cultural, and/or economic ties to other
nodes in the network. According to witness accounts, most residents probably left
Bay Bulls harbour while the French were still in the bay, boarding ships from
harbours further to the south bound for England or the American colonies.90 When
two small boats docked at Teignmouth near Exeter on 18 July, they reported that
when they had put into “Petty-harbour [just north of Bay Bulls] . . . they found the
houses entirely deserted.” There is good evidence to suggest that in the most settled
areas of the island many families simply abandoned their homes once resistance
proved impossible. In Conception Bay, “the fishermen [there were said to be] in the
utmost confusion, leaving their effects, and endeavouring to embark in the first
vessels they could meet with.”91 As indicated by Table 1, the permanent population
of Conception Bay dropped by 40 per cent between 1762 and 1763. At the same time,
the value of seal oil and furs taken in winter dropped by roughly 80 per cent while
the number of acres under cultivation decreased by 89 per cent, year over year.92
The fluid nature of the island’s economy allowed many simply to pick up and
leave.93 Where official controls on the movement of people and goods were limited
by distance or isolation, flight made it possible to escape a threatening situation and
begin anew elsewhere. But the decision to flee was constrained by the need for access
to an ocean-going ship or at least the wealth to pay for passage aboard such a vessel.
This meant that wage-labouring servants who had contracted to “ship themselves” to
the island were usually left without any means of escape, and those trapped on the
island could only try to carry on as best they could. At Trinity, John Lemon fled in
June and his servants used the provisions he left behind to keep fishing.94 In
Conception Bay, Henry Webber, a planter at Harbour Grace, fled to New England; his
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servant John Butt continued to fish and make oil until the end of the season.95 In being
stranded on the island, some actually managed to turn the situation to their advantage.
At Brigus, just south of Harbour Grace, planters James Keating and Cornelius
Cannon fled their fishing rooms, leaving behind a quantity of uncured fish and oil.
Their neighbour’s servant, John Molloly, then took the fish, cured it, and sold it at a
profit.96 Such stories, though, were the exception. Planters such as Darby Coughlan
of Fogo often tried to retain what supplies and fish they had left for themselves.
Coughlan, accordingly, sent his servants Richard Right, John Rieve, and John Koeffy
“away in an old boat with very little provisions [even] though they were desirous to
stay.”97 Those who were sent away could only look forward to a long harsh winter
without shelter or supplies.
Faced with almost certain death in winter, migrant servants were easily induced
to trade English masters for French once the fishery – their source of sustenance –
ground to a halt. The French, of course, already viewed these newly masterless men
as a reservoir of trained labour; they were not British subjects to be captured or even
liberated, but an untapped resource of colonial manpower. While the Duc de
Choiseul’s plan specifically targeted Irish Catholics, it is telling that the campaign
of destruction was orchestrated so as to ensure that the main incentive would be
economic and not national, religious, or political. The relationships between English
and Irish have often, and too simplistically, been cast in binary terms as those of
Protestant master and Catholic victim, implying that ties were defined only by
ideological, colonial, and religious struggle.98 As John Mannion has argued, though,
this ignores the important and changeable position of the Irish in the North Atlantic
world where they were as adept as other members of that wider community at
utilizing social and economic networks to secure their own interests.99
Newfoundland was simply one market among many that demanded their labour. Just
as merchants used the occupation to their advantage and planters utilized trade
networks to flee, so too were some servants able to negotiate with the French and
transition their labour between overlapping imperial economies.
The task of redirecting servant labour to French purposes fell to Jean-Baptiste
Sutton de Clonard, the Wexford salt-meat merchant, who landed with
d’Haussonville on 24 June. Just as d’Haussonville’s manifesto induced traders to
capitulate, so too did it create conditions favouring the recruitment of servants.100
Sutton then convinced servants to join him by promising to pay them from their first
day with the French, thus offering a secure economic opportunity in the face of
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hardship.101 Word of the French offer spread quickly amongst the servant population,
and it was reported that during the summer nearly 2,000 Irishmen converged on St.
John’s looking for work.102 From this pool, Sutton selected 356 of the strongest and
most able servants to join his new regiment.103 “Ces hommes sont jeunes, forts et
robustes,” he reported to Choiseul; “ils ont été accoustumés a la mer, en faisant la
pêche de la Morüe, et Seroient en etat de Servir en qualité de bons Matelots en
faisant incorporer avec eux un certain nombre d’officiers Mariniers et de Matelots
choisis pour diriger la troupe.”104 According to the detailed nominal roll that he
submitted on his return to France, the average age of these Irish recruits was just
under 23 (median 22), with the youngest being 17 and the oldest 50. When fitted out
for uniforms, 79 per cent were described as “large,” 17 per cent as “medium,” and
2 per cent as “small” – indicating that the vast majority were above average size.105
The French call appealed not only to servants, but also to planters with few social or
economic ties to the island once the fishery ceased to function. The 9 Irishmen who
were recruited to be officers in the regiment, for example, were generally older (the
average age was just over 27) and may have in fact been planters or emergent-
traders as several were educated and spoke Latin. They assisted in recruitment and
oversaw the work of several hundred additional Irish labourers, who did not join the
army but were nevertheless employed in building defences at St. John’s and in
raiding operations up the coast.106
The majority of these Irish recruits were not acting out of a deep-seated sense of
disloyalty; as English magistrate John Stripling observed, most were probably well
disposed to their English masters. But like merchants and planters, they too were
faced with simple and ultimately pragmatic choices during the occupation. The Irish
had come to Newfoundland to earn a living. With their wages lost, passage home
blocked, and the fishery suspended, exchanging English masters for French not only
provided the chance to escape a potentially deadly situation but also a way to pursue
new economic opportunities.107 Of the 334 recruits who disembarked at Brest, only
14 chose to remain in the French Army while 12 opted to join the French navy as
able seamen. The rest, wrote one official
l’on ne dois pas regardante 242 irlandais congedier comme perdu a
pour le Royaume, la permission qu’ils ont demandée d’aller
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s’embarquer dans differens Ports pour le Service du marchand dois
faire esperee qu’ils s’attacherons a la france pour toujours; et dans
la totalite il y en a tres peu qui n’ayans paru desiree
reellemens [illegible] retournee dans leur Patrie.108
In addition to the 242 who chose to join the French merchant fleet, Sutton was
also able to convince 49 to go with him on a separate expedition to Cayenne in South
America. In total, then, 87 per cent of those who joined the French in Newfoundland
chose to work as able seamen on French merchant ships. Only 8 per cent opted to
remain in either the French navy or army while the remaining 5 per cent languished
in hospital.109 Like their English masters in Newfoundland, they took advantage of
trans-Atlantic connections and overlapping socio-economic networks that acted as
conduits for migrant Irish workers in both peace and wartime.
The decisions of English and Irish civilians as well as the planning of French
officers assumed that the British would be unable to mount an expedition to relieve
the island before winter. Choiseul thus dispatched two ships with reinforcements and
supplies to assist Ternay’s efforts to hold St. John’s.110 But when British operations
against France’s Spanish ally in Havana ended successfully in the second week of
August, the North American Commander-in-Chief Jeffery Amherst ordered a
relieving force to Newfoundland. As Olaf Janzen has argued, the 1762 campaign
underscored the fundamental importance of seapower in protecting empire; in that
arena, France was no match for Great Britain.111 Both Choiseul’s ships were
captured by British patrols before they could reach Newfoundland, while Admiral
Lord Colville was easily able to sail north from Halifax and land infantry and
artillery under Colonel William Amherst at Torbay on 13 September. From there the
infantry marched overland via Quidi Vidi and surprised the French forces atop
Signal Hill, overlooking St. John’s, on the 15th. The next night, Ternay’s ships
slipped out of the harbour, leaving a small force under d’Haussonville to hold the
fort. Without reinforcements, the French commander had little choice but to
surrender three days later.
But while the French ultimately failed to hold St. John’s, Ternay’s mission
underscored the fragility of British claims to the island and the practical difficulties
of asserting imperial authority in a contested space. It highlighted emerging vertical
connections between two rival imperial networks that transcended politics,
nationality, and religion; it also emphasized the willingness and ability of people to
move between them when presented with a clear choice. From the French point of
view, Ternay’s mission had been a strategic success. Upon his return to France in
mid October, Ternay wrote to the French war minister:
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La campagne que je viens de faire quoyque moins heureux sur la fin
peut cependant estre regardée comme destructive pour la Nation
anglaise. La pêche de la morüe interçeptée pour cette année perte
que jevalüe au moins a un millier de livres Sterlings, 460 batimens
de toutes Sortes de grandeurs brulés ou coulés bas, tous les
echaffauts détruits, les habitants de St. Jean expulsés de chez eux
avec perte de tous leurs effets commerçables, 350 irlandais que je
mêne en France, et 100 prisonniers que jay fait passer sur des
parlementaires en angleterre.112
When peace negotiations resumed, the war minister reiterated his demands for
fishing rights and used the success of the raid to support French claims to the island’s
resources.113 The British Prime Minister Lord Bute agreed, in the end, to cede St.
Pierre and Miquelon to Louis XV and guaranteed use of drying beaches along the
southern “French Shore,” thus securing the future of a French presence in America
(albeit one that was infinitesimally smaller than it had been earlier in the century).114
Because the British attack on St. John’s was a dramatic victory, in which
outnumbered British soldiers scrambled up steep cliffs in heavy fog to rout superior
numbers of French troops, it has tended to overshadow in historical memory the
damage done to the island’s economy and society during the three-month
occupation. Romantic, anglo-centric narratives ignore the fact that in 1762 the
English fishery was all but destroyed. Between 1755 and 1760, total fish exported
to market had averaged 297,777 quintals per year.115 In 1762 it was 50,500 – 84 per
cent below average.116 The narrative trope of “recapture,” usually adopted by
English language historians since D.W. Prowse, also conjures up the false image that
Newfoundland was a conquered, subdued, and purely English space by the time of
the Seven Years’ War.117 It was not. Thousands of French fishermen visited the
beaches and banks of Newfoundland each year while the Inuit, Innu, and Mi’kmaq
also made use of the region’s rich resources. The island’s settler population was Irish
and English, and even then was concentrated on the eastern-most shores of the
island. Further to the west, the Beothuk continued to encounter French, English, and
other Native groups in the interior. Newfoundland was clearly a contested space, just
as it had been for more than 250 years.118
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Re-taking St. John’s, though, was just the beginning of an important period of
transition in English Newfoundland. In the wake of the occupation, governors
Thomas Graves (1762-1763) and Hugh Palliser (1764-1768) had to work hard to re-
assert formal and informal British imperial authority on the island, to stabilize the
economy, and to re-establish a society torn apart by invasion and occupation.119 Both
the limits of British authority and the extent of the socio-economic chaos are evident
in the extant court records for St. John’s, Trinity, Ferryland, and Harbour Grace,
which contain 141 separate judgements rendered between 28 September 1762 and 1
November 1765 (the end of the season in which the last case pertaining to the French
occupation was heard).120 In total, 62 per cent of these claims pertained to various
breaches of contract, 33 per cent related to property, and only 3 per cent related to
physical injuries. Twenty-nine related specifically to the occupation (21 per cent in
total), and are listed in Table 2 in chronological order. The decisions of Graves (who
adjudicated 23 of these cases) and Palliser (6) untangled a web of complaints by
merchants, planters, and servants. In doing so, they sought to address the structural
weaknesses uncovered during the raid by exerting control over the movements of
people, the portability of labour, and the relationships between debtors and creditors.
Nineteen of the judgements related to the occupation were for breach of contract
(65 per cent) and of these, 11 resulted from claims filed by servants – 10 for failure
to pay wages and 1 for failure to provide passage home. Migrant servants came to
Newfoundland on a fixed contract, usually for two summers and a winter, and were
provided with transportation home as part of that agreement. Both governors’
judgements tended to favour migrant servants, assuring that their wages were paid
even when their masters had outstanding debts to merchants. For example, on 7
October 1762 Philip Murphy, John Connels, Patrick Coffee, Edward Walsh,
“Tracey,” and “Kufe” alleged against “John Lemmon, Merchant, who lately quitted
the said harbour in fear of the enemy,” that “they did accordingly enter up on and
continue in the said service yet that David Taylor the said agent for the said
Lemmon, did and doth still refuse to pay them the balance of their wages, wherefore
they pray that the court will take the same into consideration.” In total, the 6 servants
were owed about £78 in lost wages. After deducting £9 for the provisions they had
used during the occupation to continue fishing, Lemon was ordered to pay the
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books, is reasonable to assume that these cases are related to the 1762 occupation. See various entries
between 1762 and 1765: GN2/A/1, fols. 159-69, 141-51, 155-58, 184-90, 195-6, 200-3, 258, PANL.
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balance of £69.121 As illustrated by Chart 1, 9 of the 11 judgements (82 per cent)
favoured the petitioning servants while the outcome of the other two cases is
unknown. Even in cases like that brought by William Sullivan of Titling Harbour,
who had abandoned his master for lack of provisions, Governor Graves proved
willing to grant at least partial wages.122 In adjudicating the ten cases from the
occupation involving merchants, Graves and Palliser only reached a favourable
decision for them 20 per cent of the time. In 40 per cent of the cases, they decided
against merchants or, in the other 40 per cent, ensured that debts were collected –
but only to the extent that the debtor would not be ruined.123
The success of servants’ petitions is indicative of a new official policy that was
intended to curb the power of merchant capital so as to re-assert centralized control
on the island. At the end of the 1765 season, Palliser summarized his views on the
security of the island for the Board of Trade:
[The] Inhabitants . . . are no Security to the Country but the Contrary,
for they always have and always will Join an Invading Enemy as well
from Necessity as Inclination . . . they are no better than the Property
or Slaves of the Merchant Supliyers to whom by Extravagant high
Prices of their Goods they are all largely in Debt, more than they can
ever Work out during Life, they have hitherto had no means of freeing
themselves from that State of perpetual Servitude, therefore the
Fishery still went on, tho Universally allw’d [sic] to be yearly
declining, People doom’d to Perpetual Servitude are ever wishing for
Change of masters, so when men find an Oportunity of becoming free
and Independant they will certainly Embrace it.124
In Palliser’s view, the investment of merchant capital in the resident trade
discouraged formalized resistance so long as elites were able to use their position and
wealth to negotiate favourable terms with the enemy. This process of negotiation, in
turn, would ensure that both credit and supplies would cease to flow to resident
planters, bringing the fishery to a grinding halt. Not only would planters be forced to
flee when this happened, but servants would also need to seek out new markets for
their labour or face starvation. In such an environment, where a change of masters
was possible and the relationship between master and servant was characterized by
suspicion rather than mutual dependence, servants would naturally embrace an
opportunity to better their situation by joining the enemy.125 The only viable way to
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121 Surrogate Court Records, Trinity, 7 October 1762, GN2/A/1, fol. 167, PANL.
122 Records of the Court at St. John’s, 26 October 1762, GN2/1/A, fols. 149-50, PANL. See also
Records of the Court at St. John’s, 29 October 1762, GN2/1/A, fol. 151, PANL; larger statistics
were derived from entries for 28 September 1762 to 1 November 1765, GN2/1/A, PANL.
123 Entries for 28 September 1762 to 1 November 1765, GN2/1/A, PANL; W.L. Morton, “A Note on
Palliser’s Act,” Canadian Historical Review 34, no. 1 (1953): 34-6.
124 Draft of an act “For Encouraging and Obliging the Men to Return Yearly to England,” 
18 December 1765, CO 194/16, pp. 211-12, TNA. For an analysis of the conditions faced by planters
and servants, see Matthews, “A History of the West of England-Newfoundland Fishery,” 412-14.
125 Draft of an act “For Encouraging and Obliging the Men to Return Yearly to England,” 
18 December 1765, CO 194/16, fols. 211-12, TNA, reel B-212, CNS, MUN.
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protect British interests, in Palliser’s view, was to abandon the long-standing custom
of the country that saw merchants retain first rights on a debtor’s fish, guaranteeing a
servant’s wages so long as they returned to England.126 This re-assertion of the
supremacy of the migratory fishery began under Graves but was formalized under
Palliser, who decreed in 1765 that “as a further Security for the return of the Men let
it be Unlawful to Pay any Servants Wages in Newfoundland otherways than by Bills
of Exchange for the Ballance due, such Bills to be drawn Payable to the Man only,
but to make such Bills Negotiable they may be payable to the Man’s Order, provided
he Indorses it after Landing in the King’s Dominions in Europe.”127 The legal
protection of servants’ wages was thus intended to restrict the portability of labour
and the movement of people, ensuring that labourers were hired in England and
returned there at the end of their contract.128 In other words, it sought to close off the
connections between English and non-English nodes in the North Atlantic economy.
The promotion of a migratory fishery acknowledged that Newfoundland was a
space of power where influence was shared rather than monopolized by either
officials in London or the representatives of merchant capital at the periphery.129 In
this analysis, the accumulation of a large resident population that was heavily
indebted to local traders – who themselves had little incentive to heavily invest in
imperial defensive infrastructure – was a liability that could be easily exploited
during an enemy invasion. Graves and Palliser thus sought to protect the rights of
creditors in disputes over debt, but only so far as it would enable fishermen to carry
on the fishery.130 The Board of Trade ultimately accepted Palliser’s arguments,
which were confirmed in decrees issued in 1767 and 1768.131 As Jerry Bannister has
argued, the act he proposed in 1765 would eventually be taken out, dusted off, and
passed in 1775 when imperial authority was again challenged as a new claimant in
the region emerged in the rebellious Thirteen Colonies.132
The 1762 occupation demonstrated the limits of English imperial power as well
as the continued existence of overlapping French and British areas of influence.
Faced with difficult choices, some merchants, traders, planters, and servants fled,
others tried to resist, while still others collaborated. These choices were
simultaneously constrained and enabled by the existence of overlapping trade
networks, which limited the choices of some while allowing others to survive and
even profit during the occupation. In a contested space of power, re-asserting
authority meant reconstructing the economy and regulating the flow of people and
trade within overlapping French and English transatlantic worlds.
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126 Bannister, Rule of the Admirals, 123-8.
127 Draft of an act “For Encouraging and Obliging the Men to Return Yearly to England,” 
18 December 1765, CO 194/16, fol. 215, TNA, reel B-212, CNS, MUN.
128 The best discussion of the evolution of law under Palliser is Bannister, Rule of the Admirals, 
158-62.
129 Morton, “A Note on Palliser’s Act,” 35-6.
130 Decree of the Governor at St. John’s, 8 September 1762, GN2/1/A, fols. 141-2, PANL; Decree of
the Governor at St. John’s 25 August 1763, GN2/1/A, fol. 184, PANL.
131 Morton, “A Note on Palliser’s Act,” 36.
132 For a thorough examination see Bannister, Rule of the Admirals, 158-64.
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Chart 1: Outcome of Total Number of Court Cases
involving Servants, Planters, and Merchants
Source: Records of the Courts at St. John’s, entries for 28 September 1762 to 
1 November 1765, GN2/1/A, PANL. Some cases included multiple parts and each
part has been treated as a separate judgement.
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